Security Information

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCESMETHODSEXEMPTION 3828 NAZI WAR CRIMES OISCLOBURE ACTOATE 2007

9 July 1952

MEMORANDUM TO: [.

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FROM:

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SUBJECT:

Material for Consultants

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1. INTERNAL CONDITIONS

a. Political

Judging from reports reaching us the political situation in Albania is unchanged. The enmity between Enver Hoxha and Mahmet Shehu continues but there is no evidence that a showdown is imminent. The Second Party Congress, held in March 1952, revealed the failures of the Communist regime. Two ministers were purged for incompetence and three others were transferred from their posts in order to devote more time to party activities, which means an increase in party discipline. The Congress has been followed by a purge of many party members as a result of embezzlement of funds, lax discipline, and other evidence of corruption.

b. Economic

The economic situation, which has been desperate for many months, has not improved. Food costs are prohibitive for the average worker and many items are completely unobtainable. At the end of the winter the U.S.S.R. was forced to contribute grain to the starving populace. The Soviet Union has provided materials and machinery for building up the industrial capacity but this has been slow to arrive and inadequate for the task. However, the Lenin Hydroelectric Plant and the Tirana

Security Information Radio Station have

Radio Station have been completed along with some railway and road developments and work continues on the draining of Lake Maliq. Construction of a large Hydroelectric plant on the Mat River has begun.

c. Military

The Army, which is also under strict government and party control, is rumored to be in the process of expanding. Confirmed reports still indicate only three divisions, however, recent information has reported five divisions. The constant movement of Army units is apparently responsible for the confusion. The Army no longer controls the internal security function. This is handled by the Sigurimi and the People's Police, although the border guards are still a directorate under the Armed Forces Command. These organs are not completely trusted by the Government due to the fact that there is forced recruitment for the police, heavy discipline control of the Army, and individual cases of resistance in the Sigurimi.

2. YUGOSLAV ATTITUDE

a. Recent reports indicate a change in the Yugoslav attitude toward Albania although statements attributed to Yugoslav spokesmen differ. A year ago Tito objected to any action against Albania for fear the U.S.S.R. would accuse his country of conspiring against Albania and use this as a pretext to attack Yugoslavia. At the same time the Yugoslavs were engaging in limited agent operations and Tito replied to an approach by King Zog that he was not prepared to collaborate in attempts to overthrow the Hoxha regime "at the present time" and that

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were it overthrown he would wish to see the present Albanian Government replaced by one similar to that now in existence in Yugoslavia.

Although the following reports vary considerably, it is evident the Yugoslavs are prosecuting a more positive, aggressive policy towards Albania.

- (1) In May 1952 King Zog's emissary to Tito was told that Yugoslavia does not care whether Albania is a monarchy or a republic provided it is friendly to Yugoslavia and that no aggression against Albania from Yugoslavia would be permitted for fear of precipitating war. However, Tito indicated willingness to discuss further plans for the overthrow of the Hoxha regime and talks, which have not materialized, were scheduled to take place in Turkey in early June between representatives of Tito and Zog.
- stated that Yugoslavia wanted Albania to be independent and not divided between Italy and Greece; that they would not object if the Cominform regime there were overthrown; that democratic groups exist in Albania as an alternative to Hoxha; and that they are no as they would a change in Albania would provoke Russia. In a conversation with the same source, Leo Mates, Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, expressed the opinion that Albania is not worth a world war and that Russia might march if her prestige were involved. The Yugoslav Minister in Rome, on the other hand, on 28 May told source that he did not believe the Russians would do anything about Albania, citing the lack of any defense treaty as proof.

Security Information In June a

- (3) In June a Yugoslav emissary met in Rome with members of the BKI and stated:
 - a. Tito will use force, if necessary to defend Albania's integrity.
 - b. Communism, though necessary to the Yugoslavs, might be harmful in Albania.
 - c. Liberation of Albania can come only from Prizren; attempts from other quarters can cause only useless sacrifice.
 - d. Yugoslav Albanians are preparing for the overthrow of the present Albanian regime at an opportune moment. Yugoslavia does not believe the U.S.S.R. will go to war for Albania.
- b. Yugoslav agent operations into Albania have increased in recent months and Yugoslav Albanians are being increasingly well treated.
- 3. Mention of a State cable which reported the Greeks are alarmed at Yugoslav intentions toward Albania and would prefer to split the country rather than stand by and see it annexed to Yugoslavia, is in order to illustrate present Greek attitudes.

4. OPERATIONS

Paris 137 5 July 1952

Since 1 April three teams have been successfully infiltrated by land into Albania. In addition, one BGFJEND agent accompanied a British team infiltrated by sea.

a. The team which reentered for a short period of time Northern Albania from Yugoslavia where it spent the winter, has exfiltrated and we are now awaiting a report of its debriefing.

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- b. Three members of a second team exfiltrated, leaving four members still within the country, and have reported extensively on their journey, a summary of which is attached.
- c. The third team has been in Albania only two weeks and has not been heard from since infiltration.

1952 operations to date have been far more successful than our 1951 operations, largely due to the superior calibre of the agents.

5. DEBRIEFING REPORT

The following summary debriefing report is included in this paper as it provides up to date information on conditions inside Albania and an insight into the operations of our teams. As mentioned above, this report came from three members of a 7 man team presently operating in North Central Albania. These individuals exfiltrated due to food conditions, to report on their mission, and because their job of guiding the team to its area of operations was completed.

l. The majority of Communists are reported to be ready to work with any organization which plans to overthrow the Government because of disappointment with the present regime, the belief that the U.S.S.R. will not risk war over Albania, and the fear that the Hoxha Government will fall and they will have to account to any new Government. Even the police are no longer trusted by the Government and it is believed less than \(\frac{1}{4} \) of the police force is now in favor. Ninety people out of a hundred are said to be ready to act if some serious attempt is made to overthrow the Government but they would want reassurance that there would be no territorial concessions to Greece, Yugoslavia or Italy.

Security Information 2. The population is

- 2. The population is confused by the different sponsorship of teams entering the country and feels that unless the various groups are united more harm than good is done by their entry. The Government makes effective propaganda from this situation by charging that the NCFA, working out of Greece, intends to turn North Epirus over to the Greeks; the Italian-sponsored teams are working to bring the country under Italian control again; and the Yugoslav Committee will give the Kossovo region to Yugoslavia. Since captured members of previous teams reported the names of those who had aided them many people feel it is better to turn any teams in to the authorities. Yugoslav teams are said to have no influence with the population nor are those sent in by the Greeks regarded with favor.
- 3. There are small resistance groups in every village and town, active in some degree. These resistance groups operate independently and have no contacts outside the country. A number of team contacts expressed a desire to work with resistance forces outside, one a member of the Sigurimi.
- 4. In spite of the distrust of the Police by the Government and the anti-Government sentiment reported to exist, the population has since 1 March been issued arms, with up to 100 rifles supplied in towns of 400. Watch is kept in each town and village from 2000 to 2400 hours to guard against infiltration of agents and to pick up any leaflets or supplies dropped.
- 5. The food situation is extremely grave and a kilo of bread costs 70 lek, while the ordinary laborer receives from 75-120 lek a day. The emergency rations carried by the team enabled them to travel without

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having to obtain food locally and accounted for their successful infiltration and exfiltration. The population was pleased with the idea of the food packages dropped by the NCFA but felt that only Party members gained from them as no one was allowed to keep any package picked up. Although the Government announced the food was poisoned the team reported no evidence that this was believed by the people.

- 6. The documentation carried by the team withstood the test of examination by authorities by whom they were stopped and by friends contacted.
- 7. The team reported that it was vital that any future teams be provided with Albanian currency.

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Attachment Map

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